TOP SECRET

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SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: IDWD Detachment
c/o American Military Attache
London, England
Naval Fleet Post Office, No.100

1. Transmitted herewith for TICOM is a report of interrogation of the German national, Kurt Friedrichsohn, former member of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklaerung 6.

2. The attached report on Russian code and cipher procedure, entitled Russische Schluesselverfahren! was written by Friedrichsohn at the request of Army Security Agency, Europe.

2 Incls:
Incl.#1 - Rpt.of Interrogation
Incl.#2 - Rpt.on Russian Codes and Ciphers

EARLE F. COOK
Colonel, Signal Corps
Chief

TOP SECRET

SECRET

INTERROGATION REPORT OF KURT FRIEDRICHSOHN
FORMER MEMBER OF KOMMANDEUR DER
NACHRICHTENAUFKLAERUNG 6

Attached is the report of the interrogation of Kurt FRIEDRICHSOHN former member of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklaerung 6, carried out by Counter Intelligence Corps at request of Army Security Agency, Europe.

REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF KURT FRIEDRICHSON, FORMER MEMBER OF KOMMANDEUR DER NACHRICHTENAUFKLAERUNG 6.

Personal Data

Surname: Friedrichsohn

Christian Name: Kurt

Aliases: Fridrichsons

Date and place of birth: 22 July 1914. Riga, Latvia

Nationality claimed: Latvian

Occupation: Cable and high frequency operator

Religion: Protestant

Description:

Height:	1.77 m
Weight:	60 kilos
Build:	Slender
Face:	Long
Hair:	Blonde
Eyes:	Green-gray

Last Permanent Address: Obb. Staudacherstrasse 26, Marquartstein, Bavaria

Present Address: Bayerisch Gmain, Haus Alpenblick

Languages: Danish, Latvian, Russian, German, English, a little French

Father: Alexander Fridichsons, report in Riga. Deceased 1917 as officer in Russian Army

Mother: Irma (nee Ambergs)

Brothers: None

Sisters: None

Wife: Edith (nee Klohk). Latvian. Married 1939.

Children: Three

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS:

FRIEDRICHSOHN, Kurt was born 22 July 1914 in Riga, Latvia, the only son of ALEXANDER FRIDRICHSONS and his wife Irma, nee AMBERG. His father, a Russian officer with General Denikin, died in 1917. Friedrichsohn attended grammar and high school in Riga and then went to the Technische Fachschule in Riga for four years (1924-1929) where he specialized in electrotechnics.

In 1929 he found employment as assistant operator in Riga with a branch of the Great Northern Telegraph Company (head office Copenhagen) and was sent to telegraph operators' school in Libau. This course lasted six months. He graduated as a telegraph operator in July 1932 and was assigned a position as second operator with the Great Northern Telegraph Company in Riga.

On 15 March 1936 he was drafted into the Latvian Army, where he served, until April 1937, as a telegraph and W/T operator with the Latvian Army Signal Corps. He was released with the rank of corporal.

After his release he resumed his former position with the Great Northern Telegraph Company and was transferred on 23 July 1938 to Libau. He married Edith KLOHK 12 October 1939.

When the first Russian Armies invaded Latvia, Friedrichsohn decided to leave with his wife and mother. They arrived in Germany 27 February 1940 and settled in Posen and Schrimm, where he opened a tobacco store 1 May 1940.

On 5 June 1941 Friedrichsohn was drafted into the German Army, attached to the 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 256th Infantry Regiment in Landsberg on the Warthe. After four weeks of infantry basic training he was transferred to the 3rd Drivers Detachment in Rathenow. He passed his driver's permit Class I, II, and III and then became a driver to the 288th Infantry Regiment in Potsdam, which was scheduled to go to Africa. Friedrichsohn arrived in Greece and was later shipped to Italy.

By special request of his mother, Friedrichsohn was taken from the combat outfit and returned to Germany in March 1942. He was attached to the 1st Company, 1st Batallion, 8th Regiment in Frankfurt/Oder, but his release from combat duty was not honored because his father had died as a Russian soldier. Because of his knowledge of Russian he was transferred in February 1943 to the Intelligence Corps, Translators' Detachment in Meissen where he received training as an intelligence translator specializing in the Russian language. After a psychological test he was transferred to the training section of the German Army Signal Corps in Jueterbog where he received special training in Russian ciphers. On 1 March 1944 he was sent as decipherer and translator to the German Army Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA 6) in Minsk, where he was attached to the cryptanalytic section.

On 1 September 1944 Friedrichsohn was made a non-commissioned officer. When KONA 6 was dissolved in December 1944 he returned to the Signal Service Battalion (Nachrichten Betriebs Abteilung) in Jueterbog where he was hospitalized for two months. Toward the end of April 1945 he was transferred

to KONA 1 in Austria, but never arrived at his destination. One day after the arrival of American troops (5 May 1945) he joined his wife in Marquartstein, Bavaria, where she had been evacuated. On 1 June 1945 he reported to a prisoner of war camp to obtain his papers of release from the German Army. On 15 June he was released by the American Occupation troops in Goetting.

Friedrichsohn remained unemployed in Marquartstein until 15 July 1945 when he volunteered to become a woodcutter. He worked at this until approximately February 1946, when, through an interrogation by the Counter Intelligence Corps at Garmisch, it was discovered that he had been a translator with the German Intelligence Service. As a result he was arrested, sent to Grauenstein, and then to a political prisoner camp in order to be released.

Friedrichsohn is now employed in a weather station on the Predigstuhl, Bad Reichenhall.

The following report was written by Friedrichsohn at the request of the Counter Intelligence Corps concerning German signal intelligence activities. *

General

"In Hitler's Germany great importance was attributed to the Communications Intelligence Branch, which was accordingly developed and staffed. The NA (Nachrichten Aufklarung) was divided into two large groups:

"a. Fernaufklarung (long distance intelligence)
b. Nahaufklarung (close intelligence).

"As far as organization is concerned those two groups were built up on different bases. This rested in the fact of the character of their different fields. Principally however, they were quite similar.

"The purpose of the NA was to collect intelligence from radio messages and to evaluate them.

Fernaufklaerung

"The headquarters of the NFA (Nachrichten-Fernaufklarung) was located with the OKW (Ober Quartier der Wehrmacht) and was called Chi-OKW. Subordinated to this headquarters of the NFA were several static listening stations, as for instance the one of Breslau. Those listening stations were purely military installations manned by soldiers who wore the collar insignia of the Intelligence Corps. There were also several police listening stations which would channel to the Chi-OKW all communications which lay in the field of the OKW. The headquarters of this police listening station is not known to me, nor is their purpose. However I presume that the police listening posts gave the proper background to the deciphering section of the Foreign Ministry.

"The static listening stations of the Chi-OKW had the mission to listen to all radio communications on a certain wave length and to record them. The people who manned this equipment were soldiers of the Intelligence Corps who were specially trained for this work, and were able to work with maximum speed, approximately 120 letters a minute, or 24 five-letter groups. For this purpose they had special receivers which are not technically known to me. This is now the business works:

"Operator X has the task of watching a certain wave length, for instance from 6,000-6,150 kilocycles. If he now hears a broadcast between those wave lengths he records it, puts down the time, call signal, wave length, and turns the message over to his superior.

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* A translation by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the original report which was written in German. Army Security Agency, Europe received only the translation.

This message is then processed to the first deciphering station. The particular call signs determine the group of messages to which it is related. Messages were divided into the following groups:

"a. Messages from behind the enemy lines;
b. Messages sent by agents;
c. Messages sent by diplomats;
d. German communications, also Army communication systems, and others.

"Those communications were channeled to the various deciphering stations. The various groups of decipherers were active within the scope of the Chi-OKW. Those groups consisted of specialists, or specially trained people, who tried to decipher those messages which were of course always coded, and in such manner as to make them clear. When the key for a message was found, the decoded messages were translated and forwarded for analysis. When a key was found it was carded, and the messages which came in with the same key were read.

"The analysis of the messages was handled by a special group of soldiers, about which I do not know anything.

"The above information should only give a general picture of the Fernaufklarung. It is quite possible that there are other things too, but I don't know about them as the Fernaufklarung is only something which I know about from hearsay, and from various conversations with my colleagues. Principally however I believe it worked in above described manner.

Nahaufklaerung

"The NNA was located with all armies on all fronts. Its mission was to listen to all radio communications of the enemy on all fronts, and to provide all German headquarters, from Divisions to as high up as Armies, with the contents of all radio communications, whether in clear or in code, of the enemy messages. For this purpose existed several Aufklarungs-Kommandeure with their subordinate units, such as companies, listening and tapping troops. Those were completely self-sufficient, which compared militarily to a battalion of the infantry, for instance. Technically those sections were under the control of the headquarters for Signal Intelligence, on the Eastern front there were five Nachrichtenaufklarungs Kommandeure with their subordinate units (companies). Those companies in turn had listening and tapping troops under their control. It may be noted that there was a separate company working in Finland.

"The following will show the various responsibilities:

"a. Nachrichten-Aufklarungs Kdr.Nr.X

1) Stab
2) Nachr.Aufkl.u.Ausw.Stelle X
(Translation: Signal Intelligence Analysis Section
X. Subordinate or responsible to the Army.)

"b. Nachr.Aufkl.Kompanien XYX
(Subordinate or responsible to Armies)

"c. Nachr.Nahaufkl.Horch und Lauschtrupps (responsible to Division)

"Every Kommandeure has three to four companies, depending on the need of them. Companies in turn have under their control four or five listening and tapping troops.

OPERATIONS

"The smallest signal intelligence unit was the listening troop and the tapping troop. Those troops were responsible to Divisions, and had their place in the Divisional table of organization. The listening troop had the task of listening to the radio communications of the enemy which were located opposite the Division. They were equipped with what is known as listening apparatus, which was very sensitive radio equipment for short wave reception. The strength of those troops was variable, but they were usually composed of a listening troop leader, usually a sergeant or a corporal, and the following enlisted men: three of four W/T's, one interpreter, one or two assistant interpreters, one decipherer, one or two telephone operators. The strength of the listening troops was usually smaller than above mentioned table of organization because of the shortage of personnel.

"The receiver was constantly switched in, and received just about every communication, whether in code, cipher, or clear, or voice transmission. When voice transmission was listened to, the interpreter or one of the second interpreters had to listen in and receive the transmission. Those transmissions were immediately translated and directed to the Divisions where they were analyzed and the corresponding operational measures taken. Coded voice transmissions were decoded or deciphered on the spot, if they were in an available key or in an easy key. They were also translated and forwarded to the Division as described above. Transmissions which could not be deciphered were forwarded to the Companies (Nachrichtenaufklarungs Kompanien) for further work. The contents of those transmissions were usually military reports or orders; usually they were daily reports with a fixed text, as for instance, "Nothing new to report", or "Everything quiet on the enemy front", or similar texts. During combat uncoded voice transmissions were often received. In those transmissions only the names of localities were coded. The transmissions always had a sender and an addressee, such as, "To the Commander of Bn. So-and-So, signed, Division Commander". Cover names were often used during voice transmissions; the call was usually an animal name. Those were the cover names of the various stations, which were changed very frequently.

"The tapping troops consisted of usually three men, an interpreter and a second interpreter, who were equipped with a special tapping equipment. Those troops were also responsible to a Division, and were sent away from the German lines into No Man's Land, or behind enemy lines, or into enemy occupied areas on a mission. The task of those troops was to listen to all telephone conversations and to mark them down. The results were placed at the disposal of the Division. Enemy telephone lines were often tapped, and conversations listened in on.

"The signal intelligence company was composed of similar personnel as in the listening troops; W/T's, decipherers, translators, second translators, and specialized personnel such as the analysis personnel and technical personnel, such as telephone operators, teletype operators, and others. The Company was attached to the Army and reported all signal intelligence matters to the Army. For this purpose there was a daily report produced by the Analysis Section. This report contained all decoded and translated messages of the day. Urgent messages were always transmitted to the Army by telephone.

"The Companies were also listening to the radio transmissions of more remote enemy units. Those transmissions were also decoded and listed. The information with regards to movement of troops, strength of units, equipment of units: tanks, artillery, etc., was obtained and deductions made. The Deciphering Section had the task of deciphering all coded messages which were received by the listening troops, to decode them, and to bring the key index up to date. The listening troops were informed about new keys so that they were able to decode messages in the field, without further delay. Coded messages which were picked up by companies or listening troops and could not be deciphered there, because the key was too complicated or in some instances because of lack of personnel, were forwarded to the Kommandeure for further work and eventual deciphering.

Kommandeure - with diagram

"This consisted, similarly to listening troops and companies, of soldiers assigned to the Intelligence Corps. Those were divided into the different sections. Here too one would find W/T's, decipherers, interpreters, second interpreters, etc. The Kommandeur was responsible to the Armies, and submitted a daily report. As the area of responsibility was a large one, this section was better staffed. Radio messages far behind the enemy lines were received there; the decoding of those messages was attempted, and if the key was available the messages were translated, etc. Messages which were sent up from companies and listening troops without being decoded there were decoded at the Kommandeure Headquarters; the messages were analyzed and the information was passed on to the Armies for the proper operational action. Transmissions which could not be decoded rapidly were transmitted to Signal Intelligence Headquarters for further work. The messages were usually transmitted by teletype.

Headquarters was not generally located near the front line. Its work consisted merely in deciphering very complicated codes and key systems. Also here there was an Analysis Section which produced a daily report. They however had no listening or tapping personnel, as the material which they worked on usually arrived from the front lines via teletype. The personnel at Headquarters was not always soldiers, but also some civilians who were professional decipherers. This was also the case in the Deciphering Section of the Foreign Ministry.

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UNGEFAHRE GLIEDERUNG DER NAHAUFKLARUNG IM OSTEN
(Stand: Fruhling 1944 - 22 Juni 1944)



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Kommandeur 6

"The NA Kommandeur No. 6 was in no way different from other signal communications intelligence units in the East. During the German advance in 1942 this unit was engaged in the southern section, and advanced there as far as the Caucasus (Maikop, Saporoshje, Krasnodar). After the Battle of Stalingrad the unit was drawn back, and settled down in Minsk. Activities were resumed there. The Kommandeur No. 6 consisted of the following:

"a. Staff Commander No. 6
b. Intelligence Analysis Section No. 6
c. Company 966 in Wilna
d. Company 627 in the neighborhood of Lemberg
e. Listening station near Riga

"The Intelligence Analysis Section No. 6 was divided into the following departments:

"1 listening department
1 interpreter and decipherers, and analysis personnel
1 section of drivers, technicians, and kitchen personnel

The work was exactly as described previously. The unit was responsible to the Army, and had as a mission to pick up enemy transmissions and partisan transmissions. Radio communications from the partisans were very active, and were in part most revealing, as far as operations on the Eastern front were concerned. As to contents, the partisan transmissions were not very valuable, as they mainly consisted of reports of past operations, as for instance "the partisan unit OTRJAD "ARTJUHOW" has blown X trains in one week", or, "During an attack against a German unit, Y soldiers were killed", etc. Besides this there were also operational messages for the delivery by 'chute of supplies, prearranged signals by reception committees, etc., congratulations on promotions, new decorations, political slogans, and also troop movements. The transmissions always had a sender and an addressee; very seldom cover names, or general addressees, such as Chief. In some cases they were addressed very generally, such as, "To All Commanders". Another side I would like to mention is that the Russians also have a Signal Communications Intelligence Group. When really important operations were being prepared, radio silence was prescribed. This however led to the conclusion that an operation was in preparation.

"DF-ing Stations: Attached to the Signal Communications Intelligence Group were several DF-ing Stations, which DF'd every transmitter according to angle calculations. The location, strength and equipment of those DF-ing stations are not known to me personally. Those DF-ing Stations were able sometimes to locate a headquarters. It would be interesting to note that Kommandeur No. 6 knew of the Russian Stalingrad offensive long before the attack, due to large

Russian troop concentrations in the Kalmuck Steppe. The German Headquarters of the Army seems however not to have been in a position to resist such a strong attack nor to undertake the necessary counter measures."

The following answers were given by Friedrichsohn in answer to questions asked by Army Security Agency, Europe through Counter Intelligence Corps:

On Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklaerung 6 -

1. When was KONA 6 activated? Where? What was its mission? When was it deactivated or disbanded? Was it sent to the western front? What was the organization on the eastern front? What units were subordinate to it? Where were they stationed? How many men comprised KONA 6 and subordinate units?

The Kommandeur der Nachrichten Aufklaerung 6 was activated in Frankfurt am Main in 1942. Its mission was to establish the positions, strength, location, armor, time of attack, organization, establishment, and equipment. It was deactivated in 1944 at Nammslav. Some of its personnel were transferred to other KONA and some to reserve troops in Berlin. Kona 6 was not sent to the west. The mission of KONA 6 on the eastern front after the retreat from Stanlingrad was supposed to employ Signal Intelligence against Russian partisans and agents, operating in Russia behind the German lines. The 1st company in Wilna and the 1st company in Lemberg were subordinated to KONA 6. Two other smaller units were also assigned to it. KONA 6 had approximately 80 men. The 1st company in Wilna had approximately 40 men, and the 1st company in Lemberg approximately 40 men. The smaller groups were comprised of about eight to ten men.

2. What traffic was intercepted by KONA 6? Was traffic analysis or cryptanalysis more important in the work? Where was traffic analysis performed? cryptanalysis? Who were the men in KONA 6 associated with traffic analysis? cryptanalysis? What do you know of the methods used in traffic analysis, such as card index file, Chi-numbers, call sign files, personality files? Where was the traffic sent after it was intercepted?

KONA 6 intercepted Russian wireless messages until 1943, and after that time, wireless messages of Partisan groups behind the German lines in Russia. Among these intercepted messages, cryptanalysis was the most important. Traffic analysis was performed by the NAAS. Special trained men in the NAAS handled this type of work. Winter, first name unknown, living somewhere in Frankfurt was one of these specialists. The analysis of all intercepted messages were filed according to the heading on the message and call signals. After decoding the messages, names are put in, to find the net and units. The analysis of intercepted messages were sent to the decoding specialists of the NAAS after decoding and translating. They were sent back to traffic analysis and then to evaluation.

3. Do you know of any German statistical studies on Russian digraphic or trigraphic frequencies? Lists of word patterns? Where are these studies now?

No information as to statistical studies on Russian digraphic or trigraphic frequencies.

4. Have you heard of the Russian "PT 39" system? How did it differ from the Russian "PT 38"? How does the Russian "PT 42" differ from the "PT 41"? When did the"PT 42" come into use?

"PT 39" was used until 1942 and was very easily read. There was very little difference between "PT 39" and "PT 38". Nothing known about "PT 41". "PT 42" came into use after 1942 as a replacement of "PT 39".

5. Who evaluated the information derived from cryptanalysis? How and to whom was it disseminated?

All information derived from cryptanalysis was evaluated by the evaluation staff and reported daily in a report called S.Q. (Sichere Quelle) and disseminated by teletype. Very important messages were disseminated to the concerned unit commanders by teletype or courier.

Other Kommandeure

1. Do you know the location, composition, organization, or any personnel of the following units on the Eastern Front?

KONA 2,8, Nord	NAK 951,955,958
NAAS 2,8	FAK 610,611,622
Feste 7	

Do you know the names or numbers of any other signal intelligence units on the eastern front?

KONA 2 was stationed in Wilna. It was composed of two or three companies. Each company was composed of two or three platoons. Each platoon was in front line field intelligence.

KONA 8 was a new unit in Yugoslavia or Romania.

KONA-Nord was KONA 3. Composed of three companies. Two companies were on the northern front and one company was in Finland.

NAAS 2 came under the command of KONA 2. It was comprised of approximately 20-30 special trained men. Was stationed in Romania or Yugoslavia.

Feste 7 was only a reception station. Was comprised of approximately 60 to 100 men who surveyed various frequencies.

NAK 951,955, and 958 were companies of KONA. Each NAK had approximately 40-60 radio operators plus four or five decoding experts and interpreters.

FAK 610,611,622 were for field intelligence stationed behind the front lines in Germany, Norway, Denmark.

KONA 1, stationed in Minsk, is an additional signal intelligence unit. It was stationed on the eastern front and is not mentioned above.

Training Course at Jueterbog

1. Describe the training course of the training section of the German Army Signal Corps at Jueterbog. How long did the course last? What systems did it cover?

The training schools of the German Army Signal Corps in Jueterbog taught mathematics, languages, and decoding. Each course lasted from four to six months. All Russian decoding systems were taught.

German General Staff Intelligence Studies

1. What do you know about German General Staff Intelligence Studies on Russia?

Nothing.

Abbreviations

1. Did the Germans have any lists of abbreviations of Russian terms? Was a file kept of such abbreviations?

A file was kept on abbreviations of Russian terms. The location of this material is unknown.

Russian Order of Battle

1. What was published by the Germans in the field of Russian Order of Battle?

Nothing is known about publications of the Russian Order of Battle.

Russian Equipment

1. Can you give any information about Russian mechanized equipment, guns, planes, etc.? Russian terms are desirable.

PATA, a fighter plane, one man, half wood, half aluminum, and slow, and the T 34, a tank which is considered the best Russian tank with a speed of 80 kilometres per hour is the only Russian equipment known.

Dictionaries

1. What dictionaries were used? Are any available?

The Toussant-Langenscheidt, and Gluchiwsky dictionaries were used by the KONA. No information is obtainable on the whereabouts of such books.

Russian Signal Intelligence Organization

1. Do you know any details of Russian signal intelligence organization?

Each Russian division had a special unit of Intelligence called the "SCHIFFROWALJNUT OTDEL". No more information is known.

Personal Friends or Acquaintances

1. With what German nationals who were former members of the German Army Signal have you been in contact by person or letter since the end of the war? Where are they now and what is their occupation?

Schubert, fnu, 1st Lt. Is presently studying mathematics in the University of Heidelberg. Code expert.

Dettman, fnu, Lt. Is presently a machine engineer in Hamburg. Was a specialist on NKVD codes.

Torlinsk, fnu, Inspektor. Is presently living in Freilassing, Saegerwerkstrasse. Was a former group leader in the German Army Signal Intelligence Service in Minsk. Is an insurance agent.

Haensel, fnu. Study advisor in Dresden. Was a decoding specialist.

Fuchs, fnu. Decoding specialist who is probably working for United States Army.

Lohoefer, fnu. Decoding expert. Now living in Essen as a hotel proprietor.